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Abstract -
 
The most widely
 
used technique in a network is 
Group communication. This helps in the reduction of the 
bandwidth usage. The major concern in group communication 
is its security of messages. Group key provides security of 
messages and hence proper group key management is very 
important in a group communication. There are various 
classifications of group key management techniques. A survey 
of these key management techniques is done
 
in this paper.
 
Keywords : group communication, group key manage-
ment. 
I. Introduction 
he most widely used technique in a network is 
group communication. Group communication is 
used in group chat, video /audio conferencing, 
sending software updates, dividing /sharing work 
among a group in a corporate environment, multi-party 
gaming, teleconferencing, telemedicine etc. Security, 
bandwidth management, speed etc are the various 
concerns on group communication. If the 
communication is properly designed and managed, 
then it will help in the effective usage of band width. The 
most critical problem that has to be addressed in any 
group communication is the security of its messages. 
Group key management is the most important among all 
its security problems. 
Multicast is an efficient technology that supports 
group communication. It helps in better utilization of 
network resources. Group key needs to be shared 
among all the members, to ensure security in group 
communication and also it needs to be maintained 
secure and fresh. This helps to ensure that only 
authorized users have group key. Every messages has 
to be encrypted with group key before transmitting. Thus 
outsiders or intruders are unable to interpret the 
messages even though they receive the encrypted 
message. 
In any practical application, the network has to 
be scalable and dynamic. Frequent membership 
changes might be there in such networks. With every 
membership change, key management operation has to 
be performed to ensure that it follows the four main rules 
in key management backward security (a new member 
joins the group should not have access to any of its past 
messages), forward security (a member who have      
left   the   group  should  not  have  access  to  its  future   
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information packets), collusion freedom (deleted 
members should not be able to deduce the group keys) 
and group confidentiality (users that were not part of the 
group ever in the past should not have access to any 
key in the multicast group). 
Proper group key management is critical for 
secure group communication. Various classifications on 
group key management techniques are discussed in 
next section. 
II.
 
Classifications of Group Key 
Management Protocols
 
Based on ‘how’
 
the key management 
operations are performed, the protocols are classified 
into centralized, de-centralized, and distributed/
 
contributory. In centralized group key management 
protocols there is a central group key server, which will 
be completely responsible for updating and distributing 
the group keys. Though this method is simple, the 
existence of single key server generates a bottleneck in 
the system. In de-centralized group key management 
systems, the entire group is divided into distinct 
subgroups and each group has a sub group controller. 
This sub group controller is responsible for key 
management operations in sub group. Also at the time 
of message transmission, this performs message 
relaying operations and so introduces delays in 
message transmission. In contributory/ distributed 
group key management each
 
group member has an 
equal share to contribute to the group key. This avoids 
the problem with centralized trust and single point of 
failure.
 
Depending on ‘when’
 
the group key is updated, 
key management techniques are divided into three: time 
driven, message driven and membership driven. Group 
key is updated at regular time intervals, for time driven 
techniques. This helps to reduce the number of rekeying 
operations in highly versatile group and also ensure 
security of the system. In message driven key 
management protocols, the rekeying happens along 
with each transmitted message. This helps to ensure the 
forward and backward security. In membership driven 
group key management protocols, the group key is 
updated when a member joins or leaves a group.
 
In the rest of this paper we focus more on the 
first category of protocols. Some examples of 
centralized and decentralized group key management 
protocols are discussed in the next section. In the rest of
 
the sections we concentrate more on various distributed 
T 
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key management techniques and their performance 
analysis. 
III. Centralized Protocols 
As discussed in the introduction section, there 
will one central key server in centralized techniques. This 
key server will be responsible for the whole re-keying 
process. Each member has a shared key called Key 
Encryption Key (KEK) with the key server. Thus for an n-
member group there will be n-keys and the server 
maintains a list of group members and keys. Anytime 
when server generates new group key, it encrypts the 
new group key with n KEKs and send those packets to 
corresponding group member. Each member then 
decrypts the packets using their KEK and retrieves the 
group key. Thus every member receives the same new 
group key. Every time when a member joins or leaves a 
group, the key server generates and distributes new 
group key to ensure forward and backward security. In 
case of large dynamic group, it will be a serious burden 
on key server to generate, encrypt and distribute n keys 
in short time. Transmission of n encrypted packets 
greatly increases the bandwidth usage. Some of the 
centralized key management techniques are described 
below.
 
a)
 
GKMP
 
Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP)[1]
 
is 
proposed by Harney and Muckenhirn[3]. This is a 
member driven protocol. The secret key (KEK) is shared 
between server and each member. In this method the 
server generates a group key packet (GKP) which 
contains a group traffic encryption key (GTEK) and a 
group key encryption key (GKEK). When a new member 
joins a group, the server generates new GKP and sends 
it securely to the new member by encrypting it with the 
KEK established with new member. With existing 
members it sends the new GKP by encrypting it with old 
GTEK. When a member leaves, the server generates 
new GKP and distributes it to the remaining members by 
encrypting it with KEK shared with each member. This 
ensures forward and backward security. But this method 
requires O(n) messages for each re-keying and so this 
method is not suitable for large dynamic groups.
 
b)
 
Hao-Hua Chu’s Protocol
 
This method is proposed by Hao-Hua Chu et 
al[2]. This is a message driven protocol. When a member 
wants to multicast a message, it generates new TEK 
and encrypts the message before transmitting. It also 
sends the TEK to group server encrypting it with the 
KEK shared between the member and group. Server 
decrypts the TEK using KEK and then the server 
unicasts the TEK to remaining group members by 
encrypting each message with the KEK shared between 
corresponding member and the server. The members 
then decrypts the message from server and retrieves the 
new TEK and then uses this key to decrypt the message 
from the initial group member. Also with every 
membership change the key server generates new TEK 
and distributes it to each member. But this adds the 
burden on server. 
c) LHK Protocol 
This is a membership driven protocol. The basis 
of this method[3] is the logical hierarchical key tree 
structure. This tree structure will be maintained in server. 
Root of the key tree is the group key. Leaf node contains 
the secret key shared between server and individual 
user. Intermediate keys are used in the distribution of 
new group keys. Out of all these keys, each member 
uses only the keys that lie on the path from that user till 
the server. So along with each membership change, the 
keys in the affected path has to be updated and re-
distributed. When a member joins or leaves a group, the 
key server generates new group key and intermediate 
keys in the affected path. Then it securely distributes the 
keys to the corresponding group members. This method 
is more scalable compared to other unicast based 
approaches. For a group of N members with degree of 
key tree as d, the communication cost will be 
O(log(dN)). But for the above mentioned unicast 
approaches it is O(n). Since this is also a centralized 
method all the disadvantages of centralized methods 
will be there for this method also. 
d) Code for Key Calculation (CKC) 
This protocol[4] is proposed by M. 
Hajyvahabzadeh, E. Eidkhani, S. A. Mortazavi and A. 
Nemaney Pour. This method is also based on logical 
key hierarchy. Unlike LHK, the intermediate node keys 
are calculated by individual users. When a member joins 
or leaves a group, the server sends only group key to 
the members. By using this key the members calculate 
other keys using node codes and a one way hash 
function. The security of this method is based mainly on 
the one wayness/strength of hash function. By this 
method it reduces the server overhead and also the 
message size. 
There are some more works in this category of 
group key management protocols like Secure Lock[5], 
One-way Function Tree[6], Centralized Flat Table Key 
Management[7] etc. 
IV. Decentralized Protocols 
In decentralized techniques, the entire group is 
divided into several subgroups. Group key is shared 
among all the members and each sub group has sub-
group key shared among the members of that sub 
group. There will be one central key server and a 
subgroup key server for each subgroup. Some 
examples of this method is described below: 
a) IOLUS 
Iolus [8] is proposed by S. Mittra. In this method 
is based on a secure distribution tree, in which all the 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Group Key Management Techniques
members are divided into certain sub-groups and these 
sub groups are arranged hierarchically to form a virtual 
secure group. When a user wants to join a multicast 
group, it locates its designated GSA (Group Security 
Agents) and sends a JOIN securely. On receipt of that 
request the GSA decides whether to approve or deny 
the request. When request is approved, it generates a 
secret key shared between new member and GSA and it 
communicates the key securely to the new member. 
GSA then saves all the relevant details about the new 
member in its secure private data base. It then sends 
out a GROUP KEY UPDATE message securely to all the 
existing members. This message contains the new sub 
group key encrypted with old sub group key and it also 
securely communicates to the new member the sub 
group key through a secure channel. 
b) KRONOS 
Setia et al[9] proposed this scalable approach. 
This is a time-driven approach and thus frequency of 
rekeying is independent of the group size and its 
dynamicity. Kronos is built on the key management 
framework IGKMP. The working is also similar to IGKMP 
with a major difference that Kronos is period based re-
keying technique. 
Some other examples of decentralized group 
key management techniques are Hydra[10], Safecast and 
MARKS[11]. The main drawback with these methods is 
that, long-term secure channels needs to be established 
by the key server with all the group members. This 
increases the cost of introducing new key server. 
V. Distributed Group Key Management 
Protocols 
Various distributed key management 
techniques like (DHSA, EDKAS, TGDH, DGKD), will be 
discussed in this section. All the four are membership 
driven protocols and so the major two operations which 
requires attention is member join and member leave. 
Member join and leave operations for all the above four 
techniques are discussed below. 
a) EDKAS (A Efficient Distributed Key Agreement 
Scheme using one Way Function Trees)  
This method[12] is based on the concept of 
distributed one way function trees. This is a period 
based group rekeying approach. This method takes an 
assumption that, all the members has already been 
passed through some admission control methods to 
make it authentic. 
In this method, each leaf node is assigned one 
ID and with root node ID as 0. For any non-leaf node 
with ID v, its child nodes will have IDs (2v+1) and 
(2v+2). Each leaf node represents the members. Each 
member has its own secret key and blinded key 
(generated by applying one way hash function). The 
secret key of a node can be calculated from the blinded 
keys of its child nodes, using a mixing function            
(Kv = f(BK2v+1, BK2v+2)). In this way the secret key 
associated with the root node (known as group key) is 
shared by all the members. Each member holds its own 
secret key. It also holds all the blinded keys of nodes 
that are sibling of the nodes in its key path starting from 
its associated leaf node up to the root node of the tree. 
A responsible member set, RM, is also associated with 
a node, which contains members in the sub tree rooted 
at its sibling node. 
Member join operation is explained in Fig 1. U7 
wants to join the group. 6 is the insertion node and U5 is 
the sponsor. Blinded key BK14 of U7 is send to U5. U5 
regenerates its secret key K13 and its blinded key BK13, 
BK6 and BK2. U5 then sends BK6 to U4, BK2 to U1,U2 and 
U3. It also sends the structure of distributed one way 
function tree structure, BK13, BK5 and BK1 to U7. Now at 
this step all the members have the required information 
to generate group key K0. The member leaving case is 
similar to that of join, with sibling node as the sponsor 
and this node is promoted to leaving nodes parent 
position. Then as discussed above, the sponsor initiates 
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Group Key Management Techniques
the re-keying operations Fig 2.
Figure 1 : EDKAS Join Operation
Figure 2 : EDKAS Leave Operation
This is actually a period based method. So the 
above single node join case is extended to a batch join 
and so upon each join a temporary key tree structure is 
generated and kept aside. At the beginning of each 
period, the temporary tree is merged to the actual tree 
structure.
Since this method is period-based, it decouples 
the frequency of rekeying from the size and membership 
 dynamics of the group. Therefore, this scheme can 
easily scale to dynamic collaborative groups. Though 
this method is theoretically efficient, its practical 
implementation is expensive.
 
b)
 
TGDH (Tree based group key agreement 
    
scheme) [13]
 
The concept of hierarchical key tree and multi-
party Diffie-Hellman is used in this method. The leaves 
of the key tree represent users.
 
In this method new node join requires two 
rounds of operation. A new node broadcasts a join 
request containing its own blinded key. The blinded key 
is calculated
 
by applying modular exponentiation 
operation on its secret key. Upon receipt of this 
message, each node calculates the insertion position. 
New node will be inserted to the shallowest point in the 
tree, so that it does not increase the tree height. 
Sponsor
 
will be the right most leaf rooted at the insertion 
node. Each member creates a new intermediate node 
with new node and sponsor as its children. After this 
step, all the members will be blocked except sponsor 
node. The sponsor generates new secret key and
 
calculates its blinded keys. Since it contains the blinded 
keys of all the other nodes, it can calculate the new 
group key. Then sponsor broadcasts all the blinded 
keys. Then all the other members and the new member 
can calculate the new group key.
 
The leave protocol is similar to that of join. The 
sponsor is the rightmost leaf node of the sub tree rooted 
at leaving nods’s
 
sibling. All the members update their
tree structure by deleting the leaving node and 
promoting the sibling node of leaving node to the
 
parent 
position of leaving node. Similar to that of join, the 
sponsor re-calculates new key and the blinded keys and 
broadcasts it to other members. The members then can 
calculate the new group key.
 
Since this protocol requires rekey initiation after 
each
 
membership change, the cost of modular 
exponentiation makes the entire system slow.
 
c)
 
DGKD (Distributed Group Key Distribution) [14]
 
The concept of sponsor and co-distributer is 
used in this method. This method is based on 
hierarchical tree structure. At join/leave, the sponsor 
generates new group key and initiates key distribution 
operation. The sponsor distributes new key with the help 
of co-distributers. Since this is distributed method all the 
group members are equally capable and mutually 
trusted. Depending on the relative location of 
joining/leaving member, any group member can have 
the potential sponsor.
 
Every member has a sponsor field which will be 
updated, if it is along the joining member’s
 
path. If new 
members sponsor id is greater than that of the node’s
 
sponsor id, then the sponsor id is replaced with the new 
node’s
 
id. In this method, the co-distributor is 
responsible for generating the affected intermediate 
node keys. The sponsor might not be having the keys 
along other branches, co-distributor
 
helps in distributing 
keys to other individual nodes.
 
The new node, mn+1, makes a join request by 
broadcasting its public key PK to all existing members 
m1,…,mn. The right most member replies to this node 
after authenticating it. It decides and broadcasts
 
the 
insertion location of new node. It then sends the virtual 
key tree and the list of public keys of other nodes to the 
new member. Then the sponsor member is decided. 
The new node’s
 
sibling node becomes the sponsor. If 
there is no sibling node, the new node itself becomes its 
sponsor. The sponsor node generates and distributes 
the new keys along its path till root. If requires members 
update the sponsor id also. In a group like the one 
shown in Fig 3, m4 generates new keys k’4-5,
 
k’4-7
 
and 
 
k’0-7
 
and broadcasts the encrypted keys using co-
distributers public keys like, {k4-7,
 
k0-7}
 
Pk7
 
and {k0-7}
 
Pk3. Co-distributers will decrypt the keys and then 
decrypt using intermediate node keys and then 
broadcast the messages to other members. The 
messages will be {k0-7}
 
k0-3
 
by m3
 
and m7
 
messages will 
be {k4-7}
 
k6-7
 
and {k’0-7}
 
k4-7.
 
m4
 
also encrypts and sends 
the key to m5: {k’4-5,
 
k’4-7,
 
k’0-7} Pk5.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
3
 
:
 
DGKD Join Operation
 
In member leave operation, sibling will act as 
sponsor (For m5
 
m4
 
will be the sponsor). m4
 
generates 
the new keys, k’4-5,
 
k’4-7
 
and k’0-7. m4
 
broadcasts the 
encrypted keys using co-distributers public keys like, 
{k4-7,
 
k0-7}
 
Pk7
 
and {k0-7}
 
Pk3. Co-distributers will decrypt 
the
 
keys and then decrypt using intermediate node keys 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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and then broadcast the messages to other members. 
The messages will be {k0-7} k0-3 by m3 and m7 messages 
will be {k4-7} k6-7 and {k’0-7} k4-7. Thus all the members 
will get new keys (Fig 4).
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
4
 
:
 
DGKD Leave Operation
 
This method
 
it uses special authentication 
methodologies. When m4 transmits new keys to m3, the 
packet contains two components. One is k0-7
 
signed 
using m4
 
private key and k0-7. So that m3 can decrypt 
and verify the authenticity of message. m3
 
while 
transmitting the message to other members, it keeps the 
signed k0-7
 
also so that each member can verify that the 
message originally came from m4.
 
There are mainly two drawbacks for this 
method. All the affected intermediate keys have to be 
generated by the sponsor member, which will increase 
the work load of sponsor. Also this method uses 
asymmetric cryptosystem, which is slower than 
symmetric system.
 
d)
 
DHSA (Distributed Group Key Management using 
Hierarchical Approach with Diffie-Hellman and 
Symmetric Algorithm) [16]
 
As name
 
indicates, this distributed group key 
management approach uses Diffie-Hellman and 
symmetric algorithm along with the concept of logical 
hierarchical key tree. In the key tree structure, the public 
key of each member is stored in leaves and the 
intermediate nodes contain the symmetric keys. Two 
types of codes are used in this method –
 
binary code 
and decimal code. Binary code is used for identifying 
the position of a member and decimal code is used in 
the calculation of intermediate node keys. A list 
containing public key of all the members and their binary 
codes (called member list) is shared by all the group 
members. On each membership change this list will be 
updated. Root node will contain the group key. 
Intermediate node key is calculated using the below 
formulae.
 
 
 
 
 
 
A sample hierarchical key tree structure is 
shown in Fig 5. When a new member wants to join a 
group he/she sends a join request message to the 
entire group. The node with no siblings will reply .If there 
are multiple nodes having no siblings, then the node 
with smallest parent binary code value replies to the join 
request. On receipt of this join request each member 
check if it has the smallest binary code value, if so then 
that node will be responsible for the key management 
operations at this join. Consider a group with 7 
members and joining node U4 (Fig 6). U4 broadcasts a 
join request to all the seven members. U3 does not have 
a sibling node so U3 will act as sponsor for U4. It 
authenticates U4. Both U3 and U4 exchanges the public 
keys and establishes a shared key (gX3X4
 
mod p, where 
X3 is the private key for U3 and X4 is the private key for 
U4.) using Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. U3 
adjusts its position to accommodate U4. U3 also 
calculates the intermediate node codes and key for
 
new 
node.
 
The updated binary code for U3and new position 
and public key for U4 are inserted into member list table. 
At this moment all the other
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
5
 
:
 
DHSA Hierarchical key tree structure
 
nodes calculates new group key by taking hash value of 
existing group key. U3 then encrypts the new group key 
using the Diffie-hellman shared key and send it to the 
new member U4. Then the members in the affected path 
will calculate the intermediate node keys using the 
decimal code and new group key.
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Keyintermediate_node = f(Keygroup  XOR  Codeintermediate_node). 
Codechild_node = (Codeparent_node || Random digit). 
Figure 6 : DHSA Join
When a member wants to leave a message, 
then its sponsor will be its sibling node. All the entries, 
corresponding to the leaving member will be deleted 
from the shared member list table and the sibling 
member adjusts its position upwards in the key tree and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
this new parent binary code will also be updated in the 
member list table. At this moment all the other members 
stops its transmissions for a while and listens to the 
sponsor (sibling node) for new group key.
 
Now the 
sponsor node calculates the new group key by applying 
the symmetric algorithm, one time pad. To reduce the 
key packet transmission the group key is transmitted in 
a specific order (as shown in Fig 7). The entire group 
members are divided into (log
 
n -1) groups ({U1,
 
U2,
 
U3,
 
U4}, {U5,
 
U6}) and one member from each group 
is randomly selected
 
(say U1 and U5). The sponsor 
member then uncast the group key to those nodes by 
encrypting with their shared keys. Then the 
representative members (U1 and U5) will multicasts the 
group key to other members by encrypting the new 
group key with their common intermediate node’s
 
(nodes U1-4
 
and U5-6
 
here) key.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
7
 
:
  
DHSA Member Leave
 
The advantage of this method falls in join 
operation rekeying. In join operation, the group key is 
transmitted only once in one message i.e. between new 
node and sponsor.
 
 
e)
 
Analysis
 
We discussed four different distributed key 
management approaches here. Their performance 
analysis based on key generation overhead and key 
communication overhead are discussed here. Key 
generation overhead is the number of keys generated 
by the sponsor member. The number of messages 
required to transmit the group key is key communication 
overhead.
 
The key generation overhead for DGKD and 
EDKAS are almost similar.
 
The key generation over head 
is least and constant for DHSA. Because, for DHSA the 
sponsor node generates only one group key. All the 
other nodes calculate the group key by taking hash 
value of existing.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 : Key generation overhead analysis for join and 
leave operations
 
For join operation, DHSA has communication 
overhead 1.
 
Because, the sponsor
 
transmits group key 
only to the new member. There is no group key 
exchange between existing members and sponsor. 
Communication overhead is the highest for EDKAS, 
because sponsor sends
 
the keys individually to each 
member.
 
At member leave, the communication 
overhead is the same for DGKD and DHSA. But the 
message size of DHSA is the least,
 
since it contains only 
group key.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Key communication overhead analysis for join 
and leave operations
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Node 
Count
Number of keys Generated
Member Join Member Leave
EDKAS DGKD DHSA EDKAS DGKD DHSA
6 4 3 1 2 2 1
7 4 3 1 2 2 1
10 6 4 1 4 3 1
11 6 4 1 4 3 1
12 6 4 1 4 3 1
23 8 5 1 6 4 1
24 8 5 1 6 4 1
25 8 5 1 6 4 1
27 8 5 1 6 4 1
28 8 5 1 6 4 1
30 8 5 1 6 4 1
Node 
Count
Number of messages  send
Member Join Member Leave
EDKAS DGKD DHSA EDKAS DGKD DHSA
6 5 3 1 4 2 2
7 6 3 1 5 2 2
8 7 5 1 6 4 2
9 8 5 1 7 4 4
10 9 5 1 8 4 4
24 23 7 1 22 6 6
25 24 7 1 23 6 6
27 26 7 1 25 6 6
28 27 7 1 26 6 6
VI. Conclusion
Various classifications of group key 
management techniques are discussed in this paper. 
We concentrated more on four different distributed key 
management techniques such as EDKAS, TGDH, DGKD 
and DHSA. From the performance analysis of the four 
methods, it is clear that, for new member join case, 
DHSA has the least key generation, key encryption and 
communication overheads and is a constant indicating 
that DHSA is more scalable than other methods.
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